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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the implications of foreign land deals in Africa especially with regard to 
agricultural trade. It is motivated essentially by large scale foreign land deals in Africa, Latin 
America, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. The empirical model adopted is based on institutional 
development theory and estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  The study 
found that large scale foreign land deals (LSFLDs) impact negatively on agricultural export in 
selected countries and the indexes of institutional framework used were found to be significant. 
Likewise, agricultural land becomes highly significant with relatively larger magnitude when 
                                                          
1 The paper is an updated version of the paper presented at the 23rd Ibima conference on Sustainable Growth, Economic 
Development and Global Competitiveness held at Valencia Spain, 13th-14th May, 2014. 
The authors appreciate the valuable contributions of participants at the conference.  Other errors and omissions are ours. 
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interacted with institutional indexes. This therefore implies that as more agricultural land is 
acquired, agricultural export tends to dwindle and incidences of food insecurity are heightened. The 
evidence from empirical investigation suggests the need for controlling the issue of massive foreign 
land deals through viable institutional framework, which can be engendered by building sound legal 
and procedural measures that will protect local rights and take into account the aspirations of local 
farmers and the welfare of citizenry.   
 
 
Keywords: Agricultural exports; food security; institutional quality; sys-GMM. 
 
JEL classification: F21; R52; Q15; Q18. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Africa and Latin America is said to have about 80 
percent of world reserves of agricultural land; 
with Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Sudan among the seven countries in 
Africa and Latin America that account for about 
half of the world land reserves. This, among 
other factors, has made Africa the most targeted 
region, which has recorded more than half of the 
foreign land projects/deals in the world. From 
available data, there have been incidences of 
large scale acquisition of land across Africa 
countries. Over 6,492,684 hectares of land has 
been acquired in Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Mali and Sudan. This represents almost half of 
the arable land in United Kingdom and three 
times the arable land of Norway. In Sudan and 
Ethiopia alone, the figures on foreign land deals 
are about 3.9 million and 1.2 million hectares, 
respectively [1].  
 
The implications of foreign land deals can be far-
reaching; though some argue that there are 
opportunities of increasing capital inflows, 
government revenue, among others for the host 
countries. However, there are serious challenges 
that the foreign land deals may portend. For 
African countries, especially those with difficulties 
in feeding their teaming population, leasing/ 
selling agricultural lands to foreign investors (who 
will use them to produce and export food for their 
population) will worsen the issue of food security. 
An example is the attempted South Korea 
Daewoo and Saudi Arabia farming investment in 
Madagascar and Sudan respectively. The 
agricultural products produced by foreign farmers 
are exported to their home countries leaving the 
recipient countries to lose their land resources 
and food produce. Another implication is the 
displacement of small scale farmers from their 
major means of survival due to their low 
bargaining power and inadequate knowledge. In 
most instances they wake up to hear of foreign 
land deals made by their governments without 
their inputs [2]. 
The major frontiers in farmland acquisition deals 
are countries with land and water constraints but 
rich in capital, such as Gulf States. Also, 
Countries such as China, South Korea and India 
with large populations and food security 
concerns seeks opportunities to produce food for 
their teeming population abroad. The present 
land acquisition in Africa would further increase 
the incidence of food insecurity in the region. The 
intervention proposed by the food aid convention 
targeted at seeking aid to improve the provision 
of reliable amount of food supplies to developing 
countries already signifies a problem. The 
present scramble for Africa’s land poses a 
serious threat to adequate food production in 
Africa. This present dilemma comprising 
increasing upwards shot in food prices, falling 
food aid to Africa and the rising land acquisition 
will likely raise the incidence of hunger in the 
region [3]. 
 
The combination of the global crises in food, 
energy, finance and the environment has driven 
a dramatic revaluation of land ownership in the 
past few years with Sub-Saharan Africa 
recognized as the site for most speculative major 
land deals [4,5]. The media and empirical 
researches have attributed foreign land 
acquisition to the need for production of food and 
bio-fuels for export to finance rich but resource-
deficient countries in the face of the recent food 
and energy crises. Also, a number of empirical 
studies attribute the rise in land and farm 
investments worldwide to a number of factors 
ranging from growing demand for food, water 
and fuel; opportunities provided by the 
speculative market; and countries seeking to 
hedge against future market upswings in food 
prices [6,4]. In the same manner, others have 
attributed the rising interest in land deals, 
particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America to 
the effects of food crisis and population 
expansion. In the words of [7], emerging 
literature and the media attributes the 
“foreignisation of space” to production of food 
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and bio-fuel for export in the aftermath of recent 
food and energy crises.  
 
One of the implications of land deals in Africa will 
be the displacement of local farmers from their 
ancestral land by turning valuable agricultural 
land for industrial use. This issue is a plight on 
Africa endowment, as farmland is not only central 
to export income for most Africa countries but 
highly significant to rural livelihood and food 
security. This makes nearly 70 percent of African 
population in the rural areas engaging in 
subsistence agriculture more vulnerable [8]. With 
the understanding that agriculture remains 
fundamental to economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, and environmental sustainability; the 
rising foreign land acquisition would endanger 
the prospect of developing Africa countries 
especially in curbing poverty. The surging food 
crisis, growing human and environmental 
pressures, and worries over food security 
culminate into intense foreign interest in farmland 
[2]. It is in this recognition that the seven 
Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investments was initiated by the World Bank, 
FAO, UNCTAD, and IFAD, and backed by the 
2010 G8 Summit in Ontario. This is crucial as the 
export of most African countries depend largely 
on commodity products that require land for 
production. Sectors such as agriculture, mining 
and quarrying can be adversely affected and in-
turn impacts the livelihood, welfare and economic 
development in developing Africa.  
 
Several media reports indicate that the least land 
deal in terms of acreage was 5,500 hectares; 
many are in million hectares. This gives some 
concern, as that the acreage of land in any 
country is limited in supply, and implies that any 
foreign acquisition reduces the available land for 
agricultural purposes [1]. Furthermore, with 
regards to the purpose of the land deals in Fig. 2, 
it can be observed that majority of them are for 
growing food crops such as rice, maize, wheat, 
sweet sorghum. Others for producing crops 
needed for bio-fuels, crops for feeding animals, 
and for investment (hedge fund). This denotes 
that foreign land acquisition is driven by the need 
to meet food security and investment that will 
yield future returns. To this end, this study 
focuses on the countries in Africa were large land 
deals have been reported. 
 
The study submits that major land deals in Africa 
with long duration (100 years) and acreage are 
made in countries known to have weak 
institutional quality and poor land governance. 
Although investors do promise employment and 
infrastructural development but often fail to 
deliver on their promises as there are no strong 
institutional machineries to drive it. It 
recommends the urgent need for recipient 
governments to clarify the kind of investment, 
how the returns from the land deals are to be 
distributed. The assessment of social and 
environmental impacts as well as transparency in 
decision-making and compensation of displaced 
land users are also recommended. This study 
concludes that foreign land acquisition is not 
utterly bad but it maintains that the recipient 
countries need to make adequate assessment of 
investment and development plans when such 
transactions are to be made, which can be done 
by setting up committee on land acquisition 
charged with the responsibility of consultation, 
implementation and compensation. 
 
2. BACKGROUND/STYLIZED FACTS 
 
2.1 Land and Land Deals in Africa 
 
The demand for land across the world has 
remained on the increase. The growing 
population among others is adjudged responsible 
for this. Since the supply of land is fixed and the 
demand varies, then there is the issue of 
inadequate land to meet economic activities. For 
instance, Fig. 1 reports that the available land for 
agricultural purposes around the world is 
consistently reducing. This implies that available 
land is insufficient for the growing population 
especially to sustain their agricultural activities. 
Also, Fig. 1 shows that agricultural land as a 
percentage of global land area has witnessed 
considerable decline with some degrees of 
fluctuations. [2,9], attributed this decline to the 
use of land for non-food production such as bio-
fuels, carbon sequestration, and forest 
protection.  
 
The consequences of unavailability of land to 
meet the growing demand for it, has brought 
about foreign land acquisitions. By this, agents 
demanding for land, seek out opportunities to 
acquire land in places outside their origin. In 
recent times, the issue of large scale foreign land 
acquisitions (LSFLAs) has remained central to 
debates among media reporters, scholars, 
policy-makers and urban managers. This is 
because of the central role of land as an 
economic resource and the possibility of value 
appreciation. These LSFLAs are acquired for 
diverse reasons. Based on this, Fig. 2 presents 
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the distribution of land projects and their drivers 
across the regions of the world. 
 
As can be observed in Fig. 2, the proportion of 
land deal in SSA is far higher than other regions 
in the world. According to [10], out of 464 land 
projects, 203 included area information that 
summed up to 56.6 million hectares (ha) cutting 
across projects in 81 countries but 48 percent of 
the projects covered 39.7 million ha, representing 
about two-third of the total area in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). This is distantly followed by East 
and South Asia with 8.3 million ha. 
 
To further buttress the observation from Fig. 2, 
[11] claimed that Africa is the most targeted. 
They observed that from the 754 land deals for 
which information was available, 56.2 million ha 
are located in Africa, 17.1 million ha in Asia and 
7 million in Latin America. A stunning revelation 
from their data is that out of the 11 most targeted 
countries by foreign land investors, about 64 
percent are African namely, Ethiopia, DR Congo, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Sudan and 
Zambia.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Agricultural land per capita and as percentage of global land 
Source: Oxfam international 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of projects/ land area across regions of the world 
Sources: Brüntrup (p.3) and Deininger et al (p.52) 
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An implication of these land deals is the 
displacement of local farmers from their ancestral 
land by turning valuable agricultural land for 
industrial purposes. Paradoxically, these 
industrial development and production are not 
targeted at the benefit of the host community, but 
for the needs of the countries of origin. The 
foregoing is a plight to Africa endowment as 
farmland is highly significant to rural livelihood 
and national food security. [2,9] noted that the 
growing human and environmental pressure 
accompanied by land acquisition has generated 
the worries over food security. The food price 
crisis has increased the anticipated returns on 
land and water resources, making farmland 
prices increase across the world.  
 
A summary of the major land deals reported in 
some African countries are presented in Table 1. 
The land deals reported in Table 1 involved both 
private foreign firms acquiring land in Africa and 
those that involved governments, for the period 
2006-2012.  
 
Table 1. Summary of land deals in Africa (2006-2012) 
 
Target country Investor’s country Nature of land deals 
Angola Lonrho (UK) 25000 ha leased for rice. Lonrho is negotiating 
for a further 125,000 ha in Mali and Malawi. 
Cameroun Unknown company (China) 10,000 ha secured for rice. 
Congo, DR China (ZTE International) 2-8 million ha secured for biofuel oil palm 
plantation. 
Congo, DR Agriculture South Africa (South 
Africa) 
10 million ha offered to farmers’ union. 
Egypt Jenat (Saudi Arabia) 10,000 ha secured for barley, wheat, and 
livestock feed. 
Ethiopia Flora Ecopower (Germany) 13,000 ha secured for biofuel crops; contract 
farming arrangement. 
Ethiopia Sun Biofuel (UK) Land secured for Jatropa (biofuel).  
Ethiopia India US$4 billion invested, including agriculture, 
flower growing and sugar estates. 
Ethiopia Unknown private investors  
(Saudi Arabia) 
Land leased in exchange for US$100 million 
investment. 
Kenya  Qatar 40,000 ha leased for fruit and vegetable 
cultivation in exchange for funding US$2.3 
billion port. 
Madagascar Daewoo (South Korea)  1.3 million ha secured for maize. 
Malawi Djibouti Unknown area of farm land leased. 
Mali Libya 100,000 ha leased for rice. 
Mozambique Skebab (Sweden) 100,000 ha secured for biofuel crops. 
Mozambique China US$800 million investment to expand rice 
production from 100,000 to 500,000 metric 
tons; political opposition to deal. 
Nigeria Trans4mation Agrictech Ltd (UK) 10,000 ha secured. 
Sudan Egypt Land secured to grow 2 million tons of wheat 
annually. 
Sudan  Jordan 25000 ha secured for livestock and crops. 
Sudan Kuwait ‘Giant’ strategic partnership; no further 
information. 
Sudan Qatar Joint holding company setup to invest in 
agriculture. 
Sudan  Saudi Arabi (Hail Agricultural 
Dev. Co) 
9,200-10,117 ha leased for wheat, vegetables 
and animal feed: 60% paid by Saudi 
government. 
Sudan South Korea 690,000 ha secured for wheat. 
Sudan United Arab Emirates (UAE) 378,000 ha total invested in by UAE. 
Sudan UAE (Abu Dhabi fund for 
development) 
30,000 ha secured for corn, alfalfa, and 
possibly wheat, potatoes, and beans. 
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Target country Investor’s country Nature of land deals 
Sudan Jarch capital (USA) 400,000 ha in Southern Sudan signed with 
local army commander. 
Tanzania CAMS Group (UK) 45,000 ha purchased for sweet sorghum. 
Tanzania Sun Biofuels (UK) 5,500 ha secured for Jatropa (biofuel). 
Tanzania Saudi Arabia 500,000 ha requested for lease. 
Tanzania China (Chongqing seed corp) 3000 ha secured for rice. 
Zambia China  2 million ha requested for Jatropha (biofuel). 
Note: In addition to the countries in this Table, land deals have also been reported in Ghana and Sierra Leone. 
 Source: Compiled from [3] 
 
Apart from Djibouti, Egypt, Libya and South 
Africa that have been reported to be involved in 
land deal in Malawi, Mali, Sudan and Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), respectively, all other 
land deals reported in Table 1 involved countries 
in the Middle East (Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia), Asia (Jordan, South Korea, China, 
India), Europe (Sweden, Germany, UK) and 
America (USA). As reported in the Table, the 
least land deal in terms of acreage was 3,000 ha; 
many are in million ha. This gives some concern 
given that the acreage of land in any country is 
limited in supply, which implies that any LSFLDs 
will reduce the available land for agricultural 
purpose.  
 
In terms of the purpose of the land deals as 
reported, it can be observed that some of these 
deals are for growing food crops such as rice, 
maize, wheat, sweet sorghum. A sizeable 
fraction is proposed for producing crops needed 
for bio-fuels, and feeding animals. This denotes 
the fact that LSFLDs is driven by the need to 
meet food security and investment that is 
anticipated to yield future returns. Table 2 further 
portends that LSFLDs are focused on agricultural 
production, which represents 32.5 million ha, 
compared to tourism and industry that accounts 
for only 2.3 and 0.1 million ha. 
 
Therefore, the implication of the massive 
increase in land deals on host communities 
remains a concern. This is based on the fact that 
local markets are marginally considered in the 
production process of foreign land investors. 
Likewise, how feasible are institutions in the host 
country able to protect and bolster the 
rights/privileges of land owners. These will be 
examined in the subsequent sections.       
 
2.2 Land and Institutions in Selected 
Countries 
 
The study presents information on the countries 
where massive land acquisition has been 
reported, the 16 countries selected include: 
Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. As 
earlier noted, the countries selected are 
countries where the instances of LSFLDs have 
been reported [3,12]. 
 
The indicator of land used adopted is arable land 
ha per persons (arlandp) and agricultural value 
added as percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (agrivalu) was used to reflect the relative 
productivity of the agricultural sector in the 
selected countries. Net food export, which is a 
proxy for food security was derived as the 
difference between food export and food import. 
Regulatory quality (RQ), which measures the 
ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations. 
Participation and human rights (PHR), the RQ 
and PHR was used as a proxy for institutional 
quality (Kaufmann et al). The value of RQ was 
used as percentile -ranging from minimum of 0 
(poorest institutional quality) to maximum of 100 
(excellent institutional quality).  
 
One major fact that can be inferred from the 
values in Table 3 is that all the countries 
experienced declined in arable land per persons 
between 1998 and 2008. Likewise, agricultural 
value added as a percentage of GDP in all the 16 
countries experienced some degrees of 
reduction in their agricultural production. On the 
average the agricultural value added as 
percentage of GDP declined from 36.41 percent 
in 1998 to about 28.49 percent in 2008 and in 
some of the countries like Angola, it reduced by 
almost 50 percent as it dropped from 13.03 
percent to as little as 6.64 percent. 
 
With regards to the indicator of food security, 
apart from Cameroon, Ghana and Malawi, all 
other countries experienced negative net food 
export in 2008. Comparing the two periods, the 
average net food export worsened by decreasing 
from $-273.41 million in 1998 to $-531.64 million 
in 2008. Given the reduced arable land per 
persons accompanied by reduced net food 
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export, there could be possible relationship 
between the two variables. As can also be 
observed in Table 3, the indicator of institutional 
quality had an average value of 30.46 in 2008 
and some of the countries like DRC and Sudan; 
it was as low as 5.30 and 7.20, respectively. This 
reflects the level of weak institutional framework 
in these countries, which might have been one of 
the factors responsible for the increased 
LSFLDs. 
 
In furtherance, the study examined the trends in 
agricultural export (agrex), food export (foodx) 
and food import (foodm) using the mean values 
of the 16 countries for the period 1995-2008. As 
shown in Fig. 3, the variables had upward trends; 
however, agricultural and food exports exhibited 
some fluctuations. The crucial observation is that 
the food import was consistently above food 
export throughout the period. The trend indicates 
that the selected countries are increasingly 
becoming net food importers. This can be 
attributed among others to the weak institutions 
and growing insufficiency of land to boost the 
productive capacity from agricultural activities.  
 
Fig. 4 is instructive as the trajectory for land 
available for agricultural purposes witnessed a 
consistent decline. The information in the graph 
about the plot of arable land ha per persons 
indicates that the value has continuously 
declined over the period 1995-2008, except in 
1996, 2003 and 2005. Another issue is that the 
value is less than 0.5 ha per persons. As can be 
observed from the graph, between 1995 and 
2007, the value for arable land ha per persons 
reduced more than 200 percent.  
 
Table 2. Sectors affected by land deals around the world (2006-2009) 
 
 All reported deals Reliable data 
Number of deals Hectares (millions) Number of deals Hectares (millions) 
Agriculture 1162 82.9 591 32.5 
Forestry 78 3.1 65 2.2 
Livestock only 55 0.4 34 0.2 
Mining 91 3.9 51 1.6 
Tourism 23 2.3 8 2.3 
Industry 20 0.3 17 0.1 
Conservation 2 0.3 2 0.3 
No Information 237 12.8 31 3.8 
Total 1668 106 799 43.1 
Source: Land matrix data (2012) 
 
Table 3. Indicators of land, food security and institutional quality in selected countries 
 
s/n Country arlandp agrivalu Net food export RQ PHR 
2008  2010 2008    2010 2008         2010 2008     2010 2008    2010 
1 Angola 0.22 0.19 13.03 6.64 -356.20 -1148.57 5.90 16.90 25.50 38.82 
2 Cameroon 0.39 0.32 25.33 19.47 115.36 78.43 26.30 26.10 37.86 32.97 
3 DRC 0.14 0.11 47.18 42.47 -182.54 -486.15 1.00 5.30 20.11 31.18 
4 Egypt 0.04 0.04 17.11 13.22 -2474.65 -3487.00 15.60 21.30 30.11 33.57 
5 Ethiopia 0.16 0.18 52.56 43.83 -105.29 -109.07 12.70 19.80 42.60 32.89 
6 Ghana 0.20 0.18 40.23 29.05 357.23 471.06 47.30 55.00 67.41 67.41 
7 Kenya 0.16 0.14 31.23 21.05 -196.89 -243.92 35.00 50.70 53.00 54.81 
8 Madagascar 0.20 0.16 30.58 24.81 -38.19 -81.28 21.50 41.50 71.53 58.20 
9 Malawi 0.23 0.21 35.58 30.11 -47.23 147.34 44.40 38.60 54.82 50.60 
10 Mali 0.45 0.39 46.47 36.54 -55.12 -155.44 37.60 40.60 58.22 57.11 
11 Mozambique 0.23 0.20 30.84 30.47 -157.31 -275.43 36.60 35.30 64.62 57.07 
12 Nigeria 0.25 0.25 49.00 33.00 -839.68 -1964.84 18.00 29.50 45.84 37.49 
13 Sierra leone 0.12 0.17 61.80 50.21 -128.15 -109.31 9.30 7.20 48.02 52.33 
14 Sudan 0.50 0.48 46.35 26.25 135.26 -745.62 7.80 7.20   
15 Tanzania 0.27 0.22 33.76 29.71 -262.38 -343.14 37.10 38.20 63.43 56.93 
16 Zambia 0.53 0.43 21.14 18.95 -138.71 -52.84 49.30 41.10 46.81 54.57 
 Average 0.26 0.23 36.14 28.49 -273.41 -531.64 25.34 30.46 48.66 48.42 
Source: Compiled from WDI 2012 
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Fig. 3. Trend in agric & food export in selected countries 
Note: Logarithmic transformed values were used to show the rate of change and make them more comparable. 
Source: Authors’ computation using African development indicators 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Trend in arable land ha per persons in the selected countries (1995-2008) 
Source: Authors’ computation using African development indicators 
 
Having established the declining trend in 
agricultural land availability and the marginal 
production from agricultural activities, the study 
went further to examine the relative institutional 
qualities of these countries. We compared the 
institutional performance of these countries with 
the average values for SSA. This is intended to 
observe their institutional quality relative with the 
average value for SSA. We used four measures 
of institutional quality—rule of law, control of 
corruption, regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness. These variables are gathered from 
Kaufmann et al., (2009) and their values range 
from -2.5 (worst/weak) to +2.5 (best/strong) 
institutional quality. 
 
Table 4 presents, among others, the measures of 
rule of law (RL) and the control of corruption 
showing the average value for the entire SSA 
and the 16 sampled countries. RL reflects the 
extent to which economic agents (inclusive of 
household land owners and foreign land 
investors) have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society. This includes the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights protection 
and the effectiveness of the legal systems. While 
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the control of corruption reveals the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain 
and the extent of elitist capture of the state for 
private interests. As reflected in Table 4, the 
lower these scores, the easier it is for foreign 
investors to relent in their responsibilities since 
they are able to influence community leaders and 
public officers with private gains. 
 
From the Table 4, SSA countries performed 
poorly, considering that the RL score ranged 
from -0.71 to -0.77. Similarly, the sampled 
countries performed even worse as they had a 
lower score ranging from -0.77 to -0.93. During 
the period, some countries had score as low as -
2.11 and -2.01.  
 
Table 4. Institutional quality in the selected countries and ssa average 
 
  
  
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
    Rule of law (RL)       
Angola -1.60 -1.57 -1.62 -1.46 -1.34 -1.25 -1.28 -1.24 
Cameroun -1.44 -1.15 -1.16 -1.16 -1.14 -1.01 -0.99 -1.04 
DRC -1.95 -2.11 -2.01 -1.87 -1.82 -1.79 -1.68 -1.61 
Egypt 0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.15 -0.09 -0.11 
Ethiopia -0.84 -0.72 -0.82 -0.79 -0.69 -0.56 -0.60 -0.76 
Ghana -0.32 -0.44 -0.03 -0.11 -0.24 -0.02 -0.10 -0.07 
Kenya  -0.98 -1.11 -0.96 -1.00 -0.89 -0.89 -0.98 -1.01 
Madagascar -0.63 -0.69 -0.32 -0.23 -0.14 -0.41 -0.46 -0.84 
Malawi -0.41 -0.56 -0.57 -0.66 -0.42 -0.53 -0.29 -0.14 
Mali -0.50 -0.51 -0.47 -0.38 -0.28 -0.40 -0.35 -0.46 
Mozambique -0.83 -0.91 -0.81 -0.75 -0.75 -0.70 -0.66 -0.50 
Nigeria -1.19 -1.30 -1.14 -1.45 -1.5 -1.14 -1.12 -1.21 
Sierra Leone -1.49 -1.18 -1.38 -1.33 -1.1 -1.16 -1.03 -0.94 
Sudan -1.60 -1.57 -1.46 -1.24 -1.52 -1.35 -1.50 -1.32 
Tanzania -0.21 -0.37 -0.42 -0.46 -0.4 -0.46 -0.28 -0.51 
Zambia -0.63 -0.58 -0.55 -0.49 -0.58 -0.63 -0.50 -0.49 
Average of 16 -0.91 -0.93 -0.86 -0.84 -0.8 -0.78 -0.74 -0.77 
SSA -0.75 -0.73 -0.72 -0.71 -0.77 -0.73 -0.74 -0.74 
Source: Authors’ compilation/computation using data from world governance indicator (2012) 
 
Table 5. Institutional quality in the selected countries and SSA average 
 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Control of corruption (CC) 
Angola -1.16 -1.39 -1.55 -1.21 -1.31 -1.19 -1.22 -1.33 
Cameroun -1.16 -1.22 -1.03 -1.10 -1.08 -1.03 -0.90 -0.98 
DRC -2.06 -1.81 -1.71 -1.53 -1.44 -1.51 -1.31 -1.38 
Egypt -0.07 -0.28 -0.40 -0.33 -0.46 -0.52 -0.67 -0.56 
Ethiopia -1.16 -0.55 -0.45 -0.50 -0.72 -0.65 -0.66 -0.70 
Ghana -0.22 -0.31 -0.16 -0.32 -0.27 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 
Kenya  -1.03 -1.13 -1.00 -1.02 -0.87 -0.89 -1.01 -0.91 
Madagascar 0.20 -0.42 -0.05 0.13 -0.12 -0.25 -0.10 -0.27 
Malawi -0.22 -0.36 -0.37 -0.97 -0.76 -0.73 -0.59 -0.42 
Mali -0.44 -0.62 -0.64 -0.38 -0.37 -0.44 -0.47 -0.68 
Mozambique -0.36 -0.71 -0.68 -0.72 -0.74 -0.66 -0.55 -0.40 
Nigeria -1.16 -1.17 -1.25 -1.47 -1.36 -1.19 -0.92 -0.99 
Sierra Leone -0.78 -0.94 -0.93 -0.80 -0.88 -1.12 -1.07 -0.76 
Sudan -1.28 -1.00 -0.93 -1.02 -1.31 -1.17 -1.49 -1.33 
Tanzania -1.03 -1.12 -1.11 -1.01 -0.67 -0.40 -0.51 -0.49 
Zambia -1.03 -0.92 -0.94 -0.98 -0.86 -0.74 -0.48 -0.57 
Average of 16 -0.81 -0.87 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.78 -0.75 -0.73 
SSA -0.59 -0.63 -0.58 -0.59 -0.67 -0.64 -0.62 -0.60 
Source: Authors’ compilation/computation using data from World Governance Indicator (2012) 
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Considering that the countries had negative 
scores for most of the period apart from Egypt 
that had positive scores in both 1996 and 2004, it 
will be rational to conclude that these countries 
legal system are not efficient to foster the 
protection of private properties and ensure 
qualitative contract terms especially in the case 
of foreign land acquisition. Likewise, the extent of 
corruption and elitist capture still remain high 
based on the SSA control of corruption ranging 
from -0.59 to -0.67. The average value for the 
sampled countries is also disheartening as it 
remains in lower pedestal to SSA. This becomes 
an issue as households and landowners suffer 
by the dispossession of their ancestral lands to 
foreign investors, with poor benefits, because of 
corrupt practices from public officers and 
traditional leaders. [13] observe that land 
acquisitions in Africa are cascaded with 
corruption due to the weakness of the 
government to enforce proper contractual 
agreement. This is the case in most parts of 
Africa where the government and other public 
officers engage in land contracts with foreigners 
with the intention of self actualisation. According 
to [14], the Shonga case in Nigeria is an evident 
to this, where the displaced white farmers from 
Zimbabwe were allotted large scale agricultural 
land which is central to the peoples’ survival. [15] 
emphasized the height of lack of transparency in 
the land deal processes in most African 
countries. This will foster corrupt practices and 
elitist capture.     
The quality of policies formulated by the 
government and the implementation of same for 
the promotion of private sector development was 
examined using the sampled countries. In cases 
where there is poor regulatory quality, the issues 
of unfair dealings come to be because there are 
no adequate institutions to regulate excesses of 
economic agents when dealing with related 
parties. From the Table 5, the value of the 
regulatory quality for SSA was negative in all he 
period. Similar reflection is observed from the 
values of the individual countries. Most of the 
countries had negative values for most of the 
period. This signifies that in these countries, 
there are poor policies to promote efficient 
private sector development. 
  
The issue of land grabbing and the attendant 
severe consequences on the household and 
community cannot be resolved without sound 
regulatory qualities. In some cases, where lands 
are taken over for exploitation; land degradation 
and pollution become paramount, and with poor 
regulatory qualities observed from the Table 5, 
the communities suffer. Some of these 
consequences include pollution of the water 
accessible to the communities, air pollution 
bringing about organic mutations and the likes. 
However, the government responsiveness 
becomes cardinal. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Institutional quality in the selected countries and SSA average 
 
  1996 1998     2000      2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Regulatory quality (RQ) 
Angola -1.45 -1.72 -1.82 -1.48 -1.25 -1.14 -1.06 -1.05 
Cameroun -1.13 -0.64 -0.60 -0.89 -0.66 -0.86 -0.83 -0.72 
DRC -1.83 -2.41 -2.11 -1.51 -1.59 -1.32 -1.30 -1.60 
Egypt 0.01 -0.34 -0.35 -0.50 -0.49 -0.42 -0.18 -0.18 
Ethiopia -1.34 -1.18 -1.16 -1.23 -0.96 -0.95 -0.83 -0.88 
Ghana -0.38 -0.24 -0.09 -0.46 -0.34 -0.06 -0.02 0.09 
Kenya  -0.37 -0.34 -0.30 -0.20 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.13 
Madagascar -1.05 -0.82 -0.46 -0.28 -0.32 -0.19 -0.32 -0.59 
Malawi -0.29 -0.23 -0.22 -0.47 -0.51 -0.45 -0.48 -0.57 
Mali -0.48 -0.24 -0.12 -0.44 -0.45 -0.41 -0.40 -0.47 
Mozambique -0.54 -0.29 -0.17 -0.30 -0.46 -0.52 -0.47 -0.37 
Nigeria -0.83 -0.93 -0.75 -1.26 -1.34 -0.91 -0.78 -0.78 
Sierra Leone -1.61 -1.33 -1.39 -1.27 -1.00 -1.17 -0.97 -0.72 
Sudan -1.37 -1.36 -1.44 -1.29 -1.17 -1.21 -1.47 -1.36 
Tanzania -0.42 -0.41 -0.25 -0.56 -0.45 -0.31 -0.50 -0.41 
Zambia -0.42 -0.12 -0.27 -0.62 -0.53 -0.65 -0.45 -0.49 
Average of 16 -0.84 -0.79 -0.72 -0.80 -0.74 -0.68 -0.64 -0.64 
SSA -0.75 -0.71 -0.67 -0.68 -0.74 -0.73 -0.74 -0.71 
Source: Authors’ compilation/computation using data from world governance indicator (2012) 
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Table 7. Institutional quality in the selected countries and SSA average 
 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Government Effectiveness (GE) 
Angola -0.84 -1.36 -1.46 -1.25 -1.34 -1.43 -1.07 -1.12 
Cameroun -1.00 -0.74 -0.67 -0.82 -0.73 -0.92 -0.79 -0.89 
DRC -1.69 -1.97 -1.96 -1.74 -1.47 -1.66 -1.68 -1.72 
Egypt -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.41 -0.26 -0.61 -0.44 -0.43 
Ethiopia -1.28 -0.94 -0.91 -0.93 -0.71 -0.59 -0.41 -0.35 
Ghana -0.11 -0.14 0.02 -0.20 -0.27 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 
Kenya  -0.34 -0.49 -0.54 -0.70 -0.59 -0.62 -0.56 -0.54 
Madagascar -0.58 -0.83 -0.64 -0.47 -0.44 -0.57 -0.63 -0.82 
Malawi -0.51 -0.31 -0.38 -0.69 -0.70 -0.75 -0.51 -0.40 
Mali -1.21 -1.05 -0.87 -0.63 -0.66 -0.77 -0.90 -0.88 
Mozambique -0.14 -0.39 -0.43 -0.44 -0.56 -0.59 -0.44 -0.47 
Nigeria -0.98 -1.12 -0.94 -0.99 -0.80 -0.88 -0.98 -1.20 
Sierra Leone -1.47 -1.46 -1.46 -1.51 -1.12 -1.18 -1.17 -1.19 
Sudan -1.12 -1.22 -1.19 -1.13 -1.23 -1.14 -1.28 -1.37 
Tanzania -0.73 -0.42 -0.42 -0.35 -0.37 -0.44 -0.48 -0.50 
Zambia -1.06 -0.86 -0.86 -0.83 -0.77 -0.78 -0.74 -0.80 
Average of 16 -0.82 -0.84 -0.81 -0.82 -0.75 -0.81 -0.75 -0.79 
SSA -0.72 -0.69 -0.69 -0.68 -0.72 -0.77 -0.75 -0.77 
Source: Authors’ compilation/computation using Data from World Governance Indicator (2012) 
 
This study underpins that in situations where the 
government are responsive to the ordeals of the 
citizens, the adverse consequences of land grab 
will be marginal. This is based on the fact that in 
cases where foreign investors are not able to 
meet up with their agreements, the government 
takes adequate measures to ensure the 
attainment of such agreement. However, in 
cases where they are easily influenced, foreign 
investors will find their way through.  
  
The data in Table 5 reveals the extent of 
government responsiveness by using 
government effectiveness as a measure. 
Government effectiveness reflects the quality of 
public officers, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. It 
includes the independence of the government 
and the extent they can easily be influenced. As 
seem in the Table 5, the SSA countries records 
negative values; this suggests that the 
governments in these countries can be easily 
influenced and when policies are developed, the 
political will to ensure the adherence to such 
policies will be lacking. Therefore, this signifies 
the intense extent of land grab in these countries.    
 
From the foregoing, this study has been able to 
prove that institutional quality matter in the extent 
of foreign land grab in Africa. As the statistics 
reveal, countries with most incidences of foreign 
land acquisition have low institutional qualities. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To further buttress the ongoing analysis, the 
study adopt an empirically investigation of the 
impact of large scale land acquisition on 
agricultural export in selected Africa countries 
where cases of LSFLD have been reported. The 
study selects 16 countries in Africa where the 
issue of foreign land deals have been reported. It 
analyzed the availability of land to agricultural 
production using the period 1995-2012. This is to 
establish the extent of land rush in these 
countries during the periods of media report 
(2006-2012) as reported in Table 1. Given the 
role of governance and institutions in this 
discourse, the study also brought to bear the 
data on institutional quality including: property 
rights and rule based government, voice and 
accountability, strength of legal rights, rule of law, 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness and 
property and human rights. 
 
The econometric analysis used panel data for the 
16 countries for the period 1995-2012. The 
model estimated draws from institutional 
development theories. The choice of the period 
was informed by data availability while cases of 
LSFLDs informed the choice of the 16 countries 
that cut across Central, East, North, Southern 
and West Africa. 
 
The generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimator was used due to the short panel 
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structure as well as ability to handle the 
challenge of endogeneity as institutions may not 
be exogenous [16,17,18]. In addition, the 
availability of land for agricultural production was 
interacted with indicators of institutional quality 
with a view to establishing whether or not both 
variables have joint significant influence on 
agricultural export and food security. 
 
3.1 Econometric Model 
 
The econometric model is based on the fact that 
Large Scale Foreign Land Acquisitions- LSFLAs 
may not have a direct measure in terms of its 
influence on agricultural export and food security. 
The study adopts the new institutional economics 
(NIE) theory and the [19] theories of institutional 
development. Thus, we used a rather indirect 
proxy with the understanding that the occurrence 
of large scale foreign land acquisitions (LSFLAs) 
will reduce the domestic land availability for 
agricultural production, which may affect 
agricultural export and food security.  
 
The model for the study is specified as follows: 
 
  =     +          +          +     ℎ   
+         +     
 
Since institutions may be endogenous in nature 
and may cause the problem of endogeneity in 
the model. Therefore, equation (1) can be 
rewritten as:  
 
  =     + ∞   
∗ +          +         
+     ℎ    +         +     
 
Our measures of institutional quality were 
grouped into three as indicated in Table 8. 
Indexes capturing different categories of the 
institutional variables were obtained which 
include Citizen Rights (crg) generated from 
strength of legal rights, participation and human 
rights, and property rights and rule based 
government. Also, political rights and 
participation index (prp) was generated from 
voice and accountability, and rule of law while 
effective governance index (gvn) was generated 
from regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness. 
 
Also, additional variables were generated which 
shows the interactions between institutional 
qualities (crg, prp, gvn) and agricultural land as 
percentage of land area (aglnd). The interaction 
between the indicators of institutional qualities 
and agricultural land (crg_aglnd, prp_aglnd & 
gvn_aglnd) was generated with a view to capture 
the effect institutional quality on land productivity 
in Africa. 
 
Table 8. Data sources and measurement 
 
Variable Description Source measurement 
Agrexp Agricultural export Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Constant US 
dollar 
Agval Agricultural value added (% of 
GDP) 
World development indicators Constant US 
dollar 
Aglnd Agricultural land (% of arable 
land)  
World development Indicators Constant US 
dollar 
Exchr Exchange rate World development indicators Rates 
Citizen rights 
Slr Strength of legal rights Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Number 
Phr Property and human rights Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Number 
Prrbg Property rights and rule based 
government 
Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Number 
Political rights and participation 
Va Voice and accountability World governance indicators Unit 
Rl Rule of law World governance indicators Unit  
Effective governance 
Rq Regulatory quality World governance Indicators Unit 
Ge Government effectiveness World governance indicators Unit 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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The models to be estimated with the inclusion of the interacting variables are as specified below: 
 
  =     + ∞   
∗ +          +          +     ℎ    +         +     _        +     
 
  =     + ∞   
∗ +          +          +     ℎ    +         +     _        +     
 
  =     + ∞   
∗ +          +          +     ℎ    +         + Θ   _        +     
 
Hypothetically, when the coefficient of crg_aglnd, 
prp_aglnd & gvn_aglnd is positive, it could be 
said that institutional quality will promote 
agricultural land capacity to enhance agricultural 
export and food security. In that case, better 
institutional quality would be deemed as 
complementing the agricultural land to boost 
agricultural export and food security. 
Alternatively, it implies that institutional quality is 
a poor accelerator of agricultural land in 
promoting export and food security. 
 
3.2 Econometric Analysis 
 
The econometric results presented in this sub-
section were mainly made to further buttress the 
descriptive stylized statistics. Thus, the results 
are presented in the Appendix while the major 
issues and implications are briefly summarised 
herein. The results in Table A1.1 were obtained 
using the indicators of institutions obtained from 
the data market of Iceland; with their categorized 
indexes interacted with agricultural land. There 
are basically three categories of institutions 
considered in the study; these include: citizen 
rights, political rights and participation and 
effective governance. 
 
As can be seen from the results, the test 
statistics for the evaluation of the model, namely: 
AR(1), AR(2), Sargan and Wald indicate that the 
model was efficient and the estimate can be 
reliable. Prior to this estimation based on system 
GMM, a preliminary analysis was done using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects 
(FE) and Random Effects (RE). However, this 
study focused on GMM estimates with a view to 
handle the possible challenge of endogeneity. 
 
Examination of the explanatory variables shows 
that the lagged values of agricultural export with 
different indicators of institution and indexes had 
the expected positive signs. The past value of 
agricultural export was statistically significant at 5 
percent in explaining the current agricultural 
export. The implication of this is that what 
happens to agricultural export in current year has 
significant influence in the subsequent year. 
Results from Table A1.1 where the performance 
of agricultural export under the institutional 
indicators of citizen rights was observed show 
that all measures of institution were significant 
except strength of legal rights (slr). An index of 
slr, phr and prrg was generated in order to obtain 
a strong measure of citizen right (crg) which was 
found to be highly significant. Likewise the 
indicator of institutional framework (crg) becomes 
highly significant with expected signs when 
interacted with agricultural land. With regards to 
agricultural land, the value had expected signs in 
all results. It was statistically significant in all the 
equations but the coefficients became relatively 
larger with interaction variables. 
 
An implication of the results is that agriculture 
land is essential in promoting agricultural export 
but the extent to which it becomes very useful 
lies in the quality of institutional arrangement of a 
country. This finding becomes interesting when it 
is viewed from the lens that most LSFLDs 
investors usually target countries that do not 
have strong institutions. In the selected African 
countries context, the need for strengthening 
institutional framework cannot be over 
emphasised. Though there was no direct 
LSFLDs case study using agricultural land as 
proxy, one could find some empirical evidence to 
suggest stronger institutional framework as 
panacea to managing land resources from the 
standpoint of the issue of LSFLDs. Thus, 
institutions matter. 
 
Likewise, we present results as readily available 
in Tables A2.1 and A3.1 where institutional 
framework capturing political rights and 
participation, and effective governance 
respectively reveal similar trend as discussed 
above. In Table A2.1, though the indicator of 
voice and accountability was not significant and 
negative but the index (of va and rl) was 
significant and become highly significant when 
interacted with agricultural land (proxy for 
LSFLD). Also in Table A2.1, though the index of 
rq and ge was not significant but became highly 
significant when interacted with agricultural land. 
Similar to the results in Table A1.1, the 
coefficient of agricultural land becomes relatively 
larger with interaction variables. The findings 
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from our estimation results have important 
implication for agricultural trade in developing 
Africa countries, most especially in the selected 
countries where LSFLDs were reported. As more 
arable agricultural land is acquired or grabbed by 
foreign investors or government, the volume of 
agricultural produce and exports dwindle which 
will ultimately widen the incidence of food 
insecurity, exacerbate poverty trap and 
culminates into foreign exchange losses. 
 
Other explanatory variables especially per capita 
income had the expected positive sign and 
significant level. Similar observation can be 
made for exchange rate. Agricultural value added 
was mainly significant for agricultural export, 
indicating that increase in the value of 
agricultural production will improve agricultural 
export. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The study, which was basically motivated by 
large scale foreign land deals (LSFLDs) explored 
the possible implications of LSFLDs in Africa with 
respect to agricultural export and food security.  
This was done by providing some empirical 
evidences on the 16 selected African countries 
where there has been instances of LSFLDs.  
 
The study concludes that most of the selected 
countries experienced considerable decline in 
arable land per persons. Similarly, it was found 
that most of the selected countries are net food 
importers indicating threat to food security, which 
has worsened between 1998 and 2012. The 
study established that reduction in arable land ha 
per persons was accompanied by increased net 
food importation indicating possible association 
between arable land ha per person and net food 
import. It was also found that the indicator of 
institutional quality in the selected countries was 
rather weak, which was relatively lower than the 
SSA average. Thus, the study confirms that most 
investors of LSFLDs mainly target countries that 
do not have strong institutional quality.  
 
In the same manner, the empirical investigation 
from the study found the interaction variables 
(crg*aglng, prp*aglng and gvn*aglng) to exert a 
highly significant variation on agricultural export. 
This implies that availability of agricultural land 
has an important implication for agricultural 
export of the host country. In cases, where land 
are acquired to service the teeming population of 
home country of foreign investors; the host 
country is left vulnerable to incidence of food 
insecurity, as majority of rural dwellers in Africa 
rely on subsistence farming for livelihood. In the 
same manner, the host country losses foreign 
exchange accruable from agricultural export, 
farmer’s income falls, food inflations rises, and 
the threshold of poverty is enhanced. 
 
The study concludes by recommending the need 
for strengthening institutional framework 
especially the promotion of reliable legal and 
procedural mechanism in order to protect local 
rights and take into cognisance the aspirations of 
citizens. It also calls for assessment of social and 
environmental impacts as well as transparency in 
decision-making whenever there are transactions 
involving land deals. Thus, the study calls for 
case study to further provide empirical evidence 
on impact assessment on samples of land deals 
in Africa. This will help to examine the 
negotiation process and possible impact such 
deals will have on the immediate host 
community. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.1. Agricultural export (citizen rights) 
 
Variables (A) (B) (C) 
lagrexp lagrexp lagrexp 
L. lagrexp 0.845*** 0.755*** 0.729*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0539) (0.0675) 
Agval 0.0113** 0.00799* 0.00805* 
 (0.00498) (0.00471) (0.00467) 
Aglnd -0.00605*** -0.00750*** -0.216*** 
 (0.00199) (0.00198) (0.0523) 
Lgdpc 0.328*** 0.208* 0.228** 
 (0.117) (0.111) (0.111) 
Exchr -5.38e-05 -0.000161*** -0.000125** 
 (4.64e-05) (5.80e-05) (5.51e-05) 
Slr 0.0187   
 (0.0267)   
Phr 0.00718**   
 (0.00327)   
prrbg 0.208**   
 (0.0855)   
crg  0.456***  
  (0.101)  
crg_aglnd   0.0110*** 
   (0.00266) 
Constant 0.129 -4.882*** 4.030*** 
 (0.887) (1.294) (1.550) 
Observations 212 212 212 
Number of id 16 16 16 
Source: Computed using stata 11.0, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A2.1. Agricultural export (political rights and participation) 
 
Variables (E) (F) (G) 
lagrexp lagrexp Lagrexp 
L. lagrexp 0.871*** 0.890*** 0.879*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0492) (0.0435) 
agval 0.0144* 0.0175** 0.0203* 
 (0.00774) (0.00833) (0.0115) 
aglnd -0.000484 0.000499 -0.0813*** 
 (0.00102) (0.000917) (0.0212) 
lgdpc 0.275 0.354* 0.459* 
 (0.194) (0.210) (0.272) 
exchr -3.72e-05 -1.51e-05 -2.07e-05 
 (5.31e-05) (5.49e-05) (4.83e-05) 
va -0.0145   
 (0.0656)   
rl 0.236**   
 (0.117)   
prp  0.117*  
  (0.0606)  
prp_aglnd   0.00423*** 
   (0.00112) 
Constant 0.753 -2.665* -0.919 
 (2.129) (1.384) (2.531) 
Observations 167 167 167 
Number of id 16 16 16 
Source: Computed using stata 11.0, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3.1. Agricultural export (effective governance) 
 
Variables (H) (I) (J) 
lagrexp lagrexp lagrexp 
L. lagrexp 0.869*** 0.902*** 0.902*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0518) (0.0473) 
agval 0.0171** 0.0193** 0.0255** 
 (0.00724) (0.00840) (0.0110) 
aglnd -0.00223 -0.00144 -0.0717*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00188) (0.0164) 
lgdpc 0.284 0.369 0.551** 
 (0.196) (0.231) (0.260) 
exchr -2.90e-05 1.28e-05 3.39e-05 
 (5.00e-05) (5.08e-05) (5.29e-05) 
rq 0.192**   
 (0.0846)   
ge 0.174   
 (0.153)   
gvn  0.113  
  (0.0708)  
gvn_aglnd   0.00363*** 
   (0.000822) 
Constant 0.811 -2.926** -2.063 
 (2.250) (1.397) (2.600) 
Observations 167 167 167 
Number of id 16 16 16 
Source: Computed using stata 11.0, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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